I. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVAT ION
The SRAM-based FPGA technology has enormously grown in terms of flexibility and computational power and thus it has imposed itself both in safety-critical and in non safety-critical application fields. The design of safety-critical electronic systems is regulated by application field-specific standards, such as the ISO 26262-5 [1] for automotive applications and the DO-254 [2] for avionic applications. These regulations highly recommend or even require the early assessment of the sensitivity to run-time faults of the system and the detection of run-time faults during the system functioning.
A significant source of run-time faults in SRAM-based FPGA systems are radiations. Radiations in the atmosphere are responsible for introducing a number of disruptive effects in digital devices [3] . Among the various effects induced by radiations, Single Event Upsets (SEUs) have particularly adverse effects on FPGAs using SRAM technology since they are able not only to cause transient faults by changing the content of flip-flops, but they may also permanently (until the next reconfiguration) corrupt a bit in the configuration memory and thus alter the functionality implemented by the system [4] .
Much work has been done in the field of radiation testing and fault emulation for the analysis of the effects of SEUs. Similarly many works about the generation of test configura tions for post-production detection of defects in FPGA devices can be found in the literature (all the related work will be presented in detail in the next sections). Nevertheless, the state of the art in the field of fault testing and analysis for SRAM based FPGA systems lacks accurate software tools for the analysis of the effects of SEUs in the configuration memory of the device and for the generation of test patterns for in-service testing of such faults. In particular, all the tools and techniques available in the literature target the stuck-at and the open/short fault models that have been demonstrated not to be accurate when the focus is on SRAM-based FPGA [5] , [6] .
In the Ph.D. dissertation from which this summary has been extracted the author presented a framework of software tools for the analysis and test of SEUs affecting the configuration memory of SRAM-based FPGA systems. The framework is composed of: (i) ASSESS, a simulator of SEUs for the assessment of the sensitivity to SEUs and of the failure prob ability due to SEUs; (ii) UA 2 TPG, a model-checking-based formal untestability prover and automatic test pattern generator for SEUs in the configuration memory; and (iii) GABES, a genetic algorithm-based environment for automatic test pattern generation for on-line application-dependent testing of SEUs in the configuration memory.
The main contribution of this thesis is to present the first simulator, untestability analyzer and automatic test pattern generator specifically intended to address SEUs affecting the configuration memory of SRAM-based FPGA systems. In particular, all the tools implement the fault model for SEUs affecting the configuration bits controlling logic resources proposed in [5] and the model for SEUs in configuration bits controlling routing resources proposed in [6] . These fault models have been demonstrated to be much more accurate than the classical stuck-at model (for logic resources) and the open/short model (for routing resources) when the analysis and test of SEUs in the configuration memory of SRAM-based Paper DDC. 3 INTERNATIONAL TEST CONFERENCE 978-1-4799-4722-5/14/$31.00 © 2014 IEEE FPGAs is addressed. All the tools are intended to support designers as early as possible during the design process and without requiring hardware prototypes of the system: to this purpose, it is worth noting that all the tools are fully vendor/model independent and that they can be applied both at the pre-and post-place-and-route stage of the design process.
II. BACKGROUND

A. The SRAM-based FPGA Technology
An FPGA is a prefabricated array of configurable logic blocks, interconnected by a configurable routing architecture and surrounded by configurable input/output blocks [7] . Usu ally, the basic configurable blocks of an FPGA are lookup tables (LUTs). A LUT can be represented as a small n-input memory, whose contents, stored in configuration bits, represent the output of the LUT itself. The configurable routing archi tecture in an FPGA provides connections among logic blocks and I/O blocks to compose a complete user-designed circuit. It consists of wires and switchboxes. Switchboxes are routing components that are configured to connect different wires. Switchboxes are configured through Programmable Intercon nect Points (PIPs), that form the desired connections. Finally, an FPGA device cOlmnunicates with external components through an input/output architecture composed of 110 pads disposed all around the FPGA's structure.
FPGA configuring consists in defining the hardware struc ture of the system by producing a programming code, called a bitstream, that, after being downloaded into the configuration memory of the device itself, specifies the functionality imple mented by LUTs and enables or disables connections among wires to connect or disconnect logic blocks to each other or logic blocks and an 110 pads.
B. Effects of Single Event Upsets on SRAM-based FPGAs
Single Event Upsets (SEUs) are faults induced by charged particles striking the silicon surface of an electronic device. SEUs consist in a change of the content of a memory location or a flip-flop that causes a change of the state of the system. When a SEU occurs into a configuration bit of an FPGA sys tem, the SEU may alter the structure of the system itself. From a modeling point of view, SEUs affecting the configuration memory of an FPGA device may not be modeled by the stuck at model that is generally assumed for digital circuits. A more accurate fault model has to be considered, as shown in [5] for logic resources and in [6] for routing resources.
1) The model of SEUs affecting configuration bits control ling logic resources: The tools presented in this summary adopt the functional fault model for SEUs affecting the configuration bits controlling the logic resources of FPGAs proposed in [5] . In the stuck-at fault model, a SEU in the configuration memory of a component causes the output of the component to be stuck at a given value. In our tools, a SEU in the configuration memory of a LUT causes an alteration of the functionality performed by the LUT. In particular, the faulty LUT will produce an incorrect value only when the configuration of its input values is the one associated with the faulty configuration bit, while for every other configuration of its input values the faulty LUT will behave correctly. 2} The model of SEUs affecting configuration bits con trolling routing resources: Depending on the position and the electrical properties of the affected PIP, a SEU in the a configuration bit controlling the routing structure can cause one of the topological modifications shown in Fig. 2 (note that the effects of SEUs in PIPs involving unused connections are not considered as they do not cause a faulty behaviour) [6] .
The effects of the modification of the routing structure of the system induced by SEUs in configuration bits controlling PIPs can be mapped on modifications of the behaviour of logic components of the netlist at a higher level of abstraction [6] .
With reference to Fig. 3 , if S is a switch box, C and D are two components directly connected to S, C i and Dj are the input pins of C and D connected to S through the PIPs P i and Pj , respectively, the five possible effects (discussed in [6] ) of a SEU in the configuration bit controlling P i or Pj are modeled as follows:
• A stuck-at on P i is modeled by setting the logic signal on C i at the corresponding fixed value.
• A bridge between Pi and Pj is modeled by exchanging the logic values on C i and Dj .
• A Wired-AND (Wired-OR) between Pi and Pj is mod eled by setting the logic signals on C i and on D j to the value P i AND (OR) Pj . • A SEU causing a Wired-MIX between P i and Pj is modeled by setting the logic signals on C i to 1 and on Dj to 0 if P i #-Pj, while leaving C i and Dj unaltered otherwise It may be observed that a given SEU in the configuration bit associated with a PIP can propagate to different routing segments, and that the same SEU can have different effects on the routing segments through which it propagates [6] .
III. ASSESS
A. Related Work: Techniques fo r SEU Sensitivity Analysis
The sensitivity to SEUs of SRAM-based FPGA systems can be analysed exploiting four main approaches: accelerated radiation testing [8] , [9] , [10], fault emulation boards [11] , [12] , [13] , analytical computation [14] , [15] , [16] , and fault simulation [17] , [18] , [19] .
The advantages of radiation testing are high accuracy and relatively short time. Drawbacks are: (i) The impossibility of injecting SEUs only in the configuration memory of the FPGA, since the whole chip area will be irradiated; (ii) a possibility that the device be permanently damaged after the experiment; and (iii) high cost.
Unlike radiation testing, fault emulation makes it possible to focus the analysis on SEUs in the configuration memory, leav ing out any other resources. Moreover fault emulation avoids the risk of damaging the device. The major drawbacks of SEU emulation boards are high costs, complex usability, and chip and vendor dependence. Moreover both fault emulation and radiation testing have an additional drawback: they are applied late in the design process, only when a physical prototype of the system is available, thus modifications of the systems may be expensive and may take a long time.
Analytical approaches have been developed to avoid the high cost of radiation testing and the long experimental time of fault injection. The drawback of these approaches is that, since the analysis is carried out without respect to the input patterns fed into the system, they are able to provide a worst case analysis while they cannot give information about the behaviour of the system in its normal operating conditions.
A large number of fault simulators for digital circuits can be found in the literature, but very few of them target SEUs. Moreover, if we look for simulators that specifically address the FPGA technology we find an even smaller number of works. In [17] results, but both do not take into account any details specific of the FPGA technology. To the best of our knowledge, the only simulator targeting SEUs in FPGAs is SST [19] . SST is a set of TCL scripts able to modify the HDL description of the circuit in order to emulate the effects of SEUs, and then to interact with standard RTL-simulators. Since SST works on the RTL representation of the system, it is just able to emulate the effects of SEUs in user resources, e.g., flip-flops and memories, but it is not able to reproduce the effects of SEUs in the configuration memory.
B. The ASSESS Tool
ASSESS is a simulator of SEUs affecting the configuration memory of SRAM-based FPGA systems. The simulator can be used for the analysis of the SEU sensitivity, i.e., the probability of a system failure given that a configuration memory bit has been corrupted by a SEU, and for the assessment of the failure probability due to SEUs, i.e., the probability of a system failure given a probability of the occurrence of an SEU in the configuration memory of the system. The main goal of ASSESS is allowing an early assessment of the robustness of the system against SEUs, still ensuring a high accuracy thanks to the implemented fault model.
The high level structure of ASSESS is shown in Figure 4 . The simulator is composed of a Netlist Simulator (NS), a SEU Injector (SI), and an Input Pattern Generator (IPG) .
The NS module is composed of the Combinational Logic module and a Sequential Logic module. The Combinational Logic module simulates the behaviour of the combinational components of the FPGA system, i.e., LUTs, I/O buffers and multiplexers. The Sequential Logic module simulates the behaviour of the sequential components of the system, i.e., various types of flip-flops.
The SI module is in charge of injecting SEUs in the netlist during the simulation. The SI module is fed with two lists of SEUs: the list of SEUs in the memory bits controlling logic components and the list of SEUs in the memory bits controlling the routing structure. The SEU injection module can work either in deterministic or in stochastic mode. The deterministic SEU injection is used to assess the SEU sensi tivity of the system. In the deterministic SEU injection SEUs are injected one at a time, at the beginning of the simulation, and the simulation end when every SEU in the fault lists has Paper DDC. 3 INTERNATIONAL TEST CONFERENCE 3 been injected. The stochastic SEU injection is used to assess the failure probability given to SEUs. The stochastic SEU injection allows to specify the maximum number of SEUs that may occur and the probability of SEU occurrence. At each clock cycle, if the maximum number of occurred SEUs has not yet been reached, a SEU will be injected with the specified probability. The IPG module is in charge of generating the input patterns with which the NS module is fed. The IPG module can work either in deterministic or in stochastic mode. In the deterministic input pattern generation, the IPG module is provided with a list of input patterns. In the stochastic input pattern generation, the IPG module is provided with the signal probability of each input signal, i.e., the probability of a given input signal of assuming value 1 at a given clock cycle, and according with these probabilities it generates the input values for the input signals of the system.
As shown in Figure 4 additional inputs of the simulator are: the Reward Functions that allow to customize the measures the user wants to perform on the simulated netlist and a configuration file, that allows the user to configure, among the other parameters, the type of fault injection and the maximum number of injected faults.
At the end of the simulation ASSESS produces the number of SEUs that caused a failure of the system. Additionally, by configuring dedicated simulation parameters, ASSESS can also generate the list of the applied input patterns and the detailed list of the SEUs that caused a failure of the system.
For a detailed discussion of ASSESS and its applications please refer to [20] , [21] , [22] , [23] , [24] , [25] , [26] IV. UA 2 TPG
A. Related Work: Techniques fo r Fault Untestability Analysis
A number of works addressing various aspects of the analysis of un testability of faults in digital systems can be found in the literature. In [27] a new subclass of untestable faults, called register enable stuck-on is defined and a method for generating property specification language (PSL) assertions for proving the untestability of this class of faults is presented. In these papers stuck-at faults on the clock-enable signals of registers at the register transfer level (RTL) are addressed. The same authors propose in [28] a hierarchical untestability identification method. The method addresses untestable faults in functional units, such as adders and multiplexers, at the RTL level.
In [29] a preprocessing method for accelerating SAT-based AT PGs by eliminating untestable faults is presented. The method takes into account the stuck-at fault model and it addresses only easy-to-classify untestable faults.
In [30] two algorithms (FILL and FUNI) for untestability demonstration of stuck-at faults are presented. FILL identi fies large subsets of illegal states in synchronous sequential circuits, and FUNI finds untestable faults that require illegal states previously found by FILL to be detected.
To the best of our knowledge no tools or methodologies specifically intended to analyse the testability of SEUs affect- ing the configuration memory of SRAM-based FPGAs have been proposed.
B. The UA 2 TPG Tool
UA 2 TPG is a tool performing a static formal analysis of the testability of SEUs affecting the configuration memory of SRAM-based FPGAs. Apart from identifying the untestable SEUs, UA 2 TPG generates a set of test patterns able to detect the 100% of the testable SEUs. UA 2 TPG relies on the Symbolic Analysis Laboratory (SAL) formal specification language [31] to model the structure of the netlist under analysis, on the Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) [32] to specify un testability theorems associated with the SEUs under analysis and on the SAL model-checker (SAL-SMC) [31] to prove the untestability theorems and to generate counterexamples that will be used to extract test patterns to detect the testable SEUs.
The overall execution flow of UA 2 TPG is shown in Figure 5 4) Build the LTL untestability theorem. 5) Invoke SAL-SMC on the untestability theorem.
• If the untestability theorem is proved (thus Sj is untestable) then log Sj in the list of the untestable SEUs.
• If the untestability theorem is not proved (thus Sj is testable) then extract the test pattern able to detect
Sj from the counter-example provided by SAL SMC and log it into the list of test patterns.
At the end of the untestability analysis the list of the untestable SEUs and the list of test patterns that test all the testable SEUs are generated. The list of test patterns contains a test for each testable SEU. This list is then compressed by eliminating all the duplicated test patterns and all those test patterns that are prefix of longer ones.
Preliminary work related to the untestability analysis of SEUs in the configuration memory of SRAM-based FPGAs has been presented in [33] , [34] , while a journal paper pre senting UA 2 TPG is currently under review.
V. GABES
A. Related Work: Testing Techniques fo r SRAM-based FPGAs
In the area of FPGA testing, two families of methods may be distinguished: application-independent and application dependent methods. Application-independent methods, such as those reported by Huang et al. [35] , Renovell et al. [36] , and Stroud et al. [37] , aim at detecting structural defects due to the manufacturing process of the chip. These techniques are mainly performed by the chip manufacturer, and thus they are also known as manufacturer-oriented techniques. These methods are called application-independent because they target every possible fault in the device without any consideration of which parts of the chip are actually used by the given design and which parts are not.
Conversely, application-dependent methods [38] , [39] , [40] address only those resources of the FPGA chip actually used by the implemented system. Since these techniques are applied by the user after the system design has been defined, they are also known as user-oriented. The basic idea behind this family of techniques is that very often an FPGA-based system uses only a subset of the resources provided by the FPGA chip. Therefore, demonstrating that the resources used by the implemented system are fault-free is sufficient to guarantee the correct operation of the system itself. Application-dependent methods have been proposed for in-service testing of both structural defects [38] , [39] and SEUs [40] .
B. The GABES Tool
A GA is a search method based on the analogy with the mechanisms of biological evolution. GAs require that any solution to a given problem be encoded, i.e., represented as a sequence of symbols, that stands for a chromosome (a sequence of genes) in the biological analogy. A GA starts from an initial set (a population) of tentative solutions (called chromosomes), selects the best ones according to a problem specific fitness function, and the selected chromosomes are combined and mutated to produce a new population. The process is repeated until a termination criterion is met.
GABES is a genetic algorithm-based environment aimed at producing a test set (TS), i.e., a set of test patterns (TPs), each selected from the population generated at some step of the GA. More precisely, the GA maintains a Dynamic Global Record Table ( DGRT) containing a list of test patterns with the respective sets of detected faults. At each generation, the fitness of each TP is evaluated in terms of the fault coverage. Then the TPs are examined in descending order of fitness and a TP is inserted in the DGRT if it detects faults that have not yet been found by previously inserted individuals. The construction of the DGRT is completed when its entries cover all faults (or a preset number of iterations has been reached), and the test patterns in the table are the final TS.
The test pattern generation process is shown in Fig. 6 . At each generation GABES feeds ASSESS with the current population of test patterns and then it waits for the fault coverage values produced as output of the simulations. These values are used to update the DGRT and to compute the fitness values of the test patterns. Then the combination and mutation operators are applied on the current generation leading to the next generation of the GA.
For more details on GABES please refer to [40] , [41] .
VI. THE SEU ANALYSIS AND TEST ENVIRONMENT
All the tools previously presented work in conjunction with an EDIF parser and with the E 2 STAR tool [24] . In particular the parser is a tool able to translate the EDIF description of the netlist into an intermediate description of the topology of the netlist in terms of connections among logic components and functionalities performed by components. Moreover the parser is able to produce a list of the effects of SEUs occurring in configuration bits associated with the logic resources used by the system under analysis. E 2 STAR is a static analyzer of the configuration memory of the SRAM-based FPGA device developed at the Politec nico di To rino. Given an FPGA device and a placed-and routed design, E 2 STAR is able to determine which are the configuration bits actually used by the design. Further E 2 STAR is also able to determine which are the logical effects of SEUs occurring in the configuration bits controlling routing resources according to the previously presented fault model. For each configuration bit associated with a routing component E 2 STAR reports the number of propagation points of a SEU occurring in the configuration bit, and for each propagation point E 2 STAR reports the logical effect. The overall structure of the SEU analysis and test envi ronment is shown in Figure 7 . After the HDL specification of the system has been synthesized, the netlist description file and the list of the effects of SEUs in the configuration bits controlling logic resources are generated by the parser from the EDIF representation of the netlist. Starting from the synthesized netlist, the place-and-route algorithm performs the placement and routing of the designed system. After this step, E 2 STAR can be performed on the post-place-and-route netlist description. When the netlist description and the two lists of faults have been generated the proposed tools can be ran.
It may be observed that the proposed environment is fully integrated in the standard design process of FPGA-based sys tems. In particular, as previously noted, all the proposed tools take an intermediate representation of the netlist produced by the parser that takes as input the EDIF file produced by the synthesis tool. Moreover, the E 2 STAR works directly on the post place-and-route netlist description file. Moreover, it is worth noting that all the proposed tools are fully FPGA vendor/model independent (only the EDIF parser and the E 2 STAR tool are Xilinx-dependent). Finally, it should be mentioned that, if the designer is not interested in analysing the effects of SEUs in the routing resources, all the tools can still be applied on the pre-place-and-route netlist taking in input only the netlist description and the list of faults in the logic.
VII. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A. The considered circuits
In order to assess the capabilities of the proposed tools we applied them to some circuits from the ITC'99 bench mark [42] . The considered benchmark circuits provide a di- versified set of test cases composed of sequential circuits with a single clock signal, no tristate buses or internal memories, modeled at the RTL level, ranging from 4 to 152 LUTs and from 4 to 59 FFs. We synthesised the VHDL code of the circuits using the Xilinx ISE CAD tool. As a target device we adopted the Xilinx Virtex-II XC2VP30 device. The charac teristics of the circuits are shown in Table I , which reports the number of SEUs affecting logic and routing resources (column L-SEUs and R-SEUs), the number of Look-Up Tables  (LUTs) , Flip-Flop (FFs), MUXes, Input and Output buffers. The computer used for all the experiments was equipped with an Intel Core i5 (QuadCore) 2.67 GHz, 256 KB L1 Cache, 1 MB L2 Cache, 8MB L3 Cache, 4 GB RAM.
In Table II we show the results of the analysis performed with E 2 STAR to the considered circuits. The table shows the number of critical configuration memory bits controlling routing resources (RoutingFaults) identified by the tool, and the number of affected nodes classified by logical effect: Stuck-at-O, Stuck-at-l, Wired-And, Wired-Mix, and Bridge. Wired-Or effects were not observed. It may be observed that, as we previously discussed, the number of propagation points per SEU in the configuration bits controlling the routing structure is much higher than the actual number of SEUs itself.
B. Results fro m the application of ASSESS
Each circuit was simulated by applying 10,000 randomly generated test patterns and performing an exhaustive fault injection. For each circuit, the same test vectors and faults were also applied to and injected into its prototype on a fault emulation board at the Politecnico di To rino. This experiment Paper DDC. 3 INTERNATIONAL TEST CONFERENCE allowed us to validate the proposed fault simulator.
The comparison between the two sets of results (fault simulation and fault emulation) is shown in Table III . The table shows the percentage of faults (both in logic and routing elements) (SimSens column) that caused a failure of the systems during the SEU simulation, and the percentage of faults (both in logic and routing elements) (FISens column) that caused a failure of the systems during fault emulations. Table III shows that ASSESS is able to accurately reproduce the effects of SEUs affecting any configuration bit of an SRAM-based FPGA system. In particular the comparison with results obtained by fault emulation shows that ASSESS has an average error of 0.1 %, with a maximum error for b02 of 0.5%.
The comparison between columns SimSens and FISens in
The accuracy of the proposed simulator is even more evident if we look at Table IV, where the results obtained with ASSESS are compared with the results obtained with a modified version of the simulator that considers stuck-at faults (that is what commercial and academic fault simulators are today able to do) instead of the accurate fault model previously discussed and with results obtained by fault emulation. It can be observed that ASSESS (SimSens column) and the fault emulation experiments (FISens column) estimate almost the same SEU sensitivity, while using a stuck-at based fault sim ulator (Sim sA Sens column) we obtain very different results. This is due to two reasons: (i) the number of stuck-at faults is much smaller than the actual number of SEUs that may occur in the configuration memory of an SRAM-based FPGA system; and (ii) as we previously discussed, the activation and propagation for stuck-at faults is completely different than for SEUs in the configuration memory. In particular, while, as we previously discussed, the error of ASSESS with respect of the fault emulation is 0.1% on average, with a maximum 0.5%, the stuck-at fault simulation has an average error of 15.1% and a maximum error, for the b08 circuit, of 56.2%. This experiment clearly shows that the analysis of the sensitivity to SEUs in the configuration memory performed by ASSESS is extremely more accurate than the one performed by the existing simulators of faults that consider the stuck-at fault model to emulate the behaviour of a faulty component in the netlist.
Using ASSESS the average time per simulated fault is dependent on the size and complexity of the circuit. Even if for small circuits the simulator is faster than the fault emulator, on average, as expected, the simulator is slower than the fault emulator. More in details, for the small circuits ASSESS took about some minutes to estimate the SEU sensitivity, while for the largest circuits it took about some hours up to some days. Nevertheless ASSESS could be used early during the design process, thus allowing designers to assess early the robustness to SEUs of the circuit. In this way ASSESS could bring two benefits to designers: (i) system modifications and corrections due to discovered weaknesses against SEUs could be performed early, thus allowing designers to save money and time; and (ii) the final radiation testing and fault emulation experiments can be performed on a prototype of the system that has been already hardened against SEUs, thus, again, allowing designers to save money and time. If we consider these points, we believe that the long time needed by the proposed SEU simulator does not represent such a high cost.
In order to show how ASSESS can be used to analyse large circuits, we performed a set of experiments on the MiniMIPS RISC processor [43] . Moreover, in order to show that ASSESS can be applied to systems synthesized for any FPGA device family, we synthesized the MiniMIPS processor for the Virtex 6 family. The synthesized circuit is composed of 5691 LUTs, 2336 flip-flops, and 138110 buffers. Columns Circuit, LUTs and FFs of Table V reports the characteristics of the MiniMIPS RISC processor for each functional unit.
The number of faults in LUTs and buffers, the number of SEUs in configuration bits for routing resources, and the number of affected nodes classified by logical effect (the analysis performed with the £ 2 STAR tool), are shown in the last seven columns of Table V. A deterministic SEU injection was performed, using 10,000 previously generated test patterns on four functional units of the processor. SEU sensitivities are reported in Table VI. Paper DDC. 3 INTERNATIONAL TEST CONFERENCE The experiments show that almost all the considered cir cuits, except for bOI, have a number of faults that cannot be tested. The average untestability is 6.6%. The highest untestability is 15.5% for b13, while the lowest is 2% for b06. SEUs in logic resources seem to be much harder to test than SEUs in routing resources. This may be explained, if we take two points into account: (i) the excitation of an SEU in a configuration bit controlling an LUT depends on the values of all the inputs of the LUT while, as we previously discussed, the excitation of an SEU in a configuration bit controlling a PIP depends on the value of one or two signals; and (ii) as we previously discussed, each SEU in the routing structure has a very large number of propagation points. If we consider only SEUs in logic resources we find an average untestability of 29.8%, with a peak of about 72.7% for b03. Considering only SEUs in routing resources we find an average untestability of 2.8%, with a peek of about 9.3% for b13.
The accuracy of the proposed tool is evident if we look at consider stuck-at faults. It can be observed how different the results are, and thus how the inaccuracy of the stuck-at fault model affects the analysis of the testability of faults, when SEUs in the configuration memory of SRAM-based FPGAs are considered. This is again due to the difference between number of SEUs and stuck-ats and to the different activation and propagation mechanisms. As we previously said, the last column of Table VII shows the length of the test patterns generated by the proposed tool (TPLen column). We point out that these test patterns are able to cover the 100% of the testable SEUs. In order to show the accuracy of the test patterns generated by UA 2 TPG for the accurate model of SEUs, with respect to test patterns generated for stuck-at faults we modified UA 2 TPG in order to consider stuck-at faults, we ran the modified version of the un testability analyzer on the considered circuits and we used ASSESS to evaluate the fault coverage obtained using the two sets of test patterns. As expected, test patterns generated by UA 2 TPG for the accurate SEU model detected the 100% of the testable faults. Test patterns generated for the stuck-at fault model obtained much lower fault coverage values: 78.9% on average, maximum 93.16% for b02 and minimum 54.03% for b03. Results from this experiment are reported in Table IX that for each circuit shows the SEU coverage obtained with the test patterns generated for the accurate model of SEUs (column F Coverage) and for stuck-at faults (column F-CoverageS A )
The time required for the analysis ranges from some seconds up to some minutes for very small and medium size circuits. For larger circuits the required time is about some hours. We believe that these times are reasonable if we take into account two different points: on the one hand this analysis should be Paper DDC. 3 INTERNATIONAL TEST CONFERENCE performed just once during the design of the system; on the other hand, by automatically generating test patterns able to test the 100% of the testable SEUs, the proposed tool could substitute other AT PG tools used in the FPGA design process, thus producing an overall benefit for the design of the system. Moreover, if we look at the analysis performed by the tool from the fault tolerance point of view instead of the testing point of view, we can see that the tool estimates an upper bound for the sensitivity to SEUs of SRAM-based FPGA systems and generates inputs that can be used to stimulate the system during fault emulation or radiation testing experiments.
D. Results fro m the application of GABES
We applied GABES to the considered ITC'99 circuits. Results from the application of GABES are shown in Table X . For each circuit columns Cov. and Length report the fault cov erage and the number of test vectors obtained with GABES.
Further, Table X compares the results obtained by GABES with those obtained by random testing (Random and Random* columns). Two different random testing trials were performed: In the first one (Random column) a random test pattern of fixed length (10,000 clock cycles) was used; in the second one (Random* column) a random test pattern with the same length as the one produced by GABES was used. It may be observed that results obtained by GABES are much better than the ones obtained by random testing: when compared to both the results in the Random column and in the Random * column, GABES achieves much higher fault coverages.
Finally, we observe that fault coverages reported in the literature for other test pattern generators [42] , [38] , are generally much higher than the ones shown here. Those tools consider the stuck-at fault model, whereas GABES addresses SEUs in any configuration bits. These faults are more difficult to detect than stuck-at faults, and, as previously observed, much more numerous. A comparison of our results with those in the literature should take these differences into account.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In the Ph.D. dissertation a framework of tools for the analysis and test of the effects of SEUs occurring in the configuration memory of SRAM-based FPGA systems has been presented. All the proposed tools implement an accurate model of SEUs affecting the configuration bits controlling both logic and routing resources of the system. This makes the proposed tools much more accurate than similar commercial and academic tools currently available.
The comparison between results obtained using the simu lator and by fault emulation has shown that ASSESS is able to very accurately reproduce the behaviour of a faulty FPGA based system. Moreover, by comparing results obtained using ASSESS with results obtained by simulating stuck-at faults, we have shown that the proposed simulator is much more accurate than similar tools today available, even if the time required for the analysis performed by ASSESS is much longer than that required by other simulators.
The application of UA 2 TPG to some circuits from ITC'99 benchmarks has shown that the tool is able to identify the untestable SEUs much more accurately than other tools for the analysis of the testability of stuck-at faults in digital circuits. Moreover, the comparison between fault coverages obtained by test patterns generated for the accurate model of SEUs and the fault coverages obtained by test pattern generated for stuck-at faults, shows that the former detect the 100% of the testable faults, while the latter reach an average fault coverage of 78.9%, with a minimum of 54% and a maximum of 93.16%.
The application of GABES to some circuits from the ITC'99 benchmark has shown that the proposed genetic algorithm reaches good scalability and efficiency in terms of both fault coverage and length of the test patterns.
